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Ixc. v. XEVADA DEsERT INK I :Ei C.2d 
A. No. 2;)254. In Bnnk. Nov. 4, 1955.] 
'l'HB GAGNON COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., 
Appellants. v. NEVADA DESERT INN, INC. (a Cor-
poration) et aL, Defendants; STANLEY BUHKE, Re-
spondent. 
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation. 
-A stockholder's representative suit is a "derivative action" 
since th<" wrong to be redressed is one against the corporation, 
which normally would bring suit, and it is justified by the 
stockholder's ultimate interest in the corporation. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders - Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-Gen-
erally, a stockholder may not maintain an action in his own 
behalf for a wrong done by a third person to the corporation 
on the theory that such wrong devalued his stock and the stock 
of other shareholders. 
[3) Id.- Stockholders- Suing on Behalf of Corporation.-An 
action is derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is in-
jury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock or 
property without any severance or distribution among in-
dividual holders, or if it seeks to recover assets for the cor-
poration or to prevent dissipation of its assets. 
[4] Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Concluded.-A judgment 
on the merits against a corporation on a wrong alleged to have 
been done to it would ordinarily be res judicata in an action 
by the stockholders on behalf of the corporation for the same 
wrong, since the wrong was to the corporation as such and not 
the stockholders individually. 
[5] !d.-Sister State Judgments- Law Governing.-Whether a 
Kevada judgment is a bar or res judicata as to another action 
on the same cause in California is controlled by Kevada law. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., ~ 1913.) 
[1] See CaLJur.2d, Corporations, § 216 et seq.; Am.Jur., Cor-
porations, § '161 et seq. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., .Judgments, § 246; Am.Jur., .Judgments, § 530 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [l-3] Corporations,§ 353; [4] Judgments, 
§439; [3-7] Judgments, §476; [8] Evidence, §37; [9] Conflirt of 
Laws, § 2; [10] Dismissal, § 2; [11-15, 29] Dismissal, § 20.1; 
[16, 20] Judgments,§ 474; [17] Judgments, ~ 313; [18, 19] Judg-
ments,~ 296; [21] .Judgments. ~ 478(1); [22] Corporations, § 635; 
[23] Attorneys. §52; [24. 27] Attorneys, ~ 6:'5; [2,5] Attorneys, 
§ 61; [26] Attorneys, § 64; [28] Corporations, § 693; [30] Judg-
ments, § 449. 
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Id.-Sister State Judgments-Law Governing. 'l'he effect of 
a valid or other interests of the parties 
and persons in them is determined the law 
of the state where was rendered. 
Id.-Sister State Judgments-Law Governing.-The effect of 
a valid judgme.nt as a conclusive adjudication between the 
and persons in with them of facts which were 
or might have been put in in the proceedings is de-
termined the law of the state where the judgment was 
rendered. 
Evidence-Judicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-.Judicial 
notice is taken of the laws of the several states and the in-
terpretation thereof by the courts of appellate juris-
diction of such states. (Code § 1875.) 
[9] Conflict of Laws-Law Governing Issues.- Where the issues 
in a case are to be determined by the application of Nevada 
law, but the Supreme Court of California ean find no Nevada 
statute or case law covering the situation, the court will look 
to the California law for a solution. 
[10] Dismissal-Retraxit.-There is a distinction between a dis-
missal voluntarily made by the clerk's entry, which is pre-
sumed to be without prrjudice to the bringing of another 
action, and a dismissal entered in open court pursuant to 
stipulation, which is ordinarily effective as a retraxit, and in 
the absence of such stipulation or motion addressed to the 
court, there is no retraxit. 
[11] !d.-Effect of Dismissal.-A dismissal with prejudice by 
plaintiff of its action is a bar to a subsequent action on the 
same cause; otherwise there would be no meaning to the 
"with prejudice" feature. 
[12] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A dismissal with prejudice termi-
nates the action and the rights of the parties are affected by 
it; it is a final judgment in favor of defendants and they 
are entitled to recover their costs. 
[13] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A mere statement that a judgment 
of dismissal is "with prejudice" is not conclusive; it is the 
nature of the action and the character of the judgment that 
determines whether it is res judicata. 
[14] !d.-Effect of DismissaL-A dismissal without prejudice is 
not a bar to another action by plaintiff on the same cause, 
but in other respects it has the effect of a final judgment in 
defendant's favor since it terminates the action and concludes 
the rights of the parties in that particular action. 
[15] !d.-Effect of Dismissal.- -,\ n order of dismissal containing 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 5. 
I"'c. C.2d 
it 1s not a bar 
action, unless the record shows that there was 
an actual dc·terminatlon on the HH-:rits. 
Judgments-Sister State Judgments-Full Faith and Credit. 
-A ;judgment of a court of a sister state 
be full faith and credit. (U.S. Const., art. IV,§ 1.) 
17b] !d.-Collateral Attack- Unauthorized Appearance by 
Attorney.-A domestic judgment may not be impeached col-
latemlly on that a regularly licensed attorney ap-
an action had no authority to act on 
[18] !d.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-On collateral attack 
every is in favor of the validity of the judgment 
or order of a court of general jurisdiction, and any condition 
of facts consistent with its validity and not affirmatively con-
tradicted the judgment roll will be presumed to have 
existed. 
[19] !d.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-On collateral attack 
on a judgment it will be presumed, when necessary, that the 
parties consented to the court's action or waived objection 
thereto. 
[20] Id.-Sister State Judgments-Full Faith and Credit.-The 
full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution ap-
plies to the records and proceedings of courts only so far as 
they have jurisdiction, and the courts of one state are not re-
quired to give full faith and credit to, or regard as valid or 
conclusive, any judgment of a court of another state which 
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties 
or, in proceedings in rem. of the res. 
[21] Id.-Sister State Judgments-Want of Jurisdiction and Col-
lateral Attack.--The jurisdiction of a court rendering a judg-
ment is open to inquiry under proper averments when ques-
tioned in the courts of another state, and such rule applies in 
the case of a judgment entered on an attorney's un-
authorized npJwnrance for a party. 
[22] Corporations-Officers--Authority .. -'rrial court was justified 
in that a director and secretary of a corporation 
had authority to commence an action by the corporation where 
there wa~ evidence, although conflicting, that she held such 
official position and that an attempt to remove her was abor-
tive. 
[23] Attorneys-Authority-Presumption.-The act of an attorney 
in entering the appearance of a party carries with it a pre-
sumption of authority on his part to do so, nnd such pre-
sumption may k• weighed against evidence to the contrary 
by the trier of fact. 
Txc. lJ. XEVADA 
448; 289 p .2d 456 J 
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Id.-Authority-Scope-Dismissals.-An attorney author-
to dismiss his client's action without 
Id.-Authority-Scope.-In civil 
the client's and in the absence 
to bind his in all matters to the r<'gular con-
duct of a case, though such authority is subject to the 
cation that an attorney does not have 
to do an act which will errect the surrender or loss 
of a client's substantial 
[26] !d.-Authority-Scope-Compromises.-An 
sumed to have authority to compromise his 
which he is prosecuting. 
is pre-
action 
[27] Id.-Authority-Scope-Dismissa.ls.-In view of the theory 
that there is a rebuttable presumption that an attorney h11s 
authority to surrender his client's rights, the trial court may be 
justified in concluding that an attorney has authority to com-
mence an action and to dismiss it with prejudice. 
[28] Corporations-Officers-Liability.-Wllether directors of a 
corporation acted collusively and fraudulently is a question 
of fact, mere allegations to that effect not being proof. 
[29] Dismissal-Effect of DismissaL-An attorney's testimony that 
he did not think that the dismissal of a Nevada action, which 
he commenced and dismissed with prejudice, would affect a 
California action should not be allowed to alter the res judicata 
effect of the Nevada judgment on collateral attack, since it 
was only his opinion of the legal effect of the dismissal. 
[30] Judgments-Res Judicata-Waiver and Estoppel.-Where the 
defense of res judicata is raised, the mere fact that the court 
confines the issue to res judicata does not foreclose plaintiffs 
from making a showing that such defense has been waived 
or that defendant is estopped from raising it, since this is a 
part of the res jndicata issue. 
APPEAl_~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for fraud and mismanagement. Judg-
ment for defendants affirmed. 
J. George Bragin and H. Ward Dawson, Jr., for Appellants. 
Pearlson & Pearlson and Herbert Pearlson for Respondent. 
CARTER, J .-Plaintiffs, alleging that they were stock-
holders of Nevada Desert Inn, a Nevada corporation, com-
menced the instant action asserting it to be on their behalf 
and as representatives of the other stockholders. Among the 
452 C.2d 
defendants are the a director and 
o:ffice.r of Desert other directors the inn and also 
Lela M. Anderson and Harold M. Morse. Burke was the only 
defendant who answered the complaint. Presumably the 
others had not been served. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Burke had fraudulently 
breached a contract with the inn under which he was to hold 
property in trust for it and funds to assist in the 
financing of the construction of a hotel in I1as Vegas, Nevada, 
and he was to take stock in the inn. They charged that he 
fraudulently took inn funds; that the other directors knew 
of Burke's actions and yet did not him; that the 
directors mismanaged the affairs of the inn and misappro-
priated the funds thereof. also fraud on the 
part of defendant Barkley in the salr of the stock to them, 
and that l\iorse, for some of the stockholders in an 
action commenced in :\TeYada the dirrctors, negligently 
permitted the action to be lost on nonsuit. 
Burke ans-wered and raisC>d the defense of res judicata by 
reason of a judgment by a Nevada court of the eighth judicial 
district. The judgment which the trial court herein found 
to be res judieata came abont as follows: 
In 1947 the inn commenced an action in the proper Nevada 
court. The complaint filed therein was verified by Lela Ander-
son who stated therein that she was the secretary of the inn. 
This action is hereafter called second NeYada action. The 
complaint was signed l\Iorse and Graves, a firm of Nevada 
attorneys, by Harold M. Morse, as attorneys for plaintiff 
therein. The action made substantially the same charges 
against Burke as are made in the instant action. Burke 
answerrd raising the general issue. A "Dismissal with Preju-
dice" signed by 1\Iorse and by Harold M. Morse, as 
attorneys for the inn was filed in that action on November 16, 
1950 (the instant action was commenced on Apri! 11, 1949), 
and based thereon the Nevada court on the same day made 
its order that it appearing that plaintiff (the inn) having 
filed its written dismissal of the action with prejudice and 
on motion of Morse and attorneys for plaintiff, the 
action is '' dismjssed \vith '' Prior to the above 
m(mtioned Nevada action a similar action by the inn, with 
.Morse as counsel, had been commenced and tried and resulted 
in a nonsuit, hereafter referrC>d to as first NC>vada action. 
Plaintiffs herr flrscribP their action as "derivative" and 
insofar as they, as stockholders of the are seeking redress 
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it is such an action. [1] "A stock-
suit has been called a 'derivative 
action' for the reason that the wrong to be redressed is one 
against the the corporation would 
bring the suit. the corporation fails or 
refuses to act after proper the stockholder's ultimate 
interest in the is sufficient to justify the bringing 
of a ' to set in motion the judicial 
machinery for the redress of 1 he wrong to the corporation.'' 
v. Cour·1. 17 Cal.2d 13, 16 [108 P.2d 
906. 135 A.hR. 318].) [2] "Generally, a stockholder 
may not maintain an action in his own behalf for a wrong 
done by a third person to the eorporation on the theory that 
such wrong devalued his stock a1Ll the stock of the other 
shareholders. for such an action Y. ·mid authorize multitu-
dinous litigation and ignore the corporate entity. Under 
proper circumstances a stockholder may bring a representative 
action or derivative action on behalf of the corporation. 
[Citations.] [3] ' ... The action is derivative, i. e., in the 
corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury 
to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stoek or prop-
erty without any severance or distribution among individual 
holders, or if it sreks to recover assrts for the corporation 
or to prevent the dissipation of its assets.' " (Sutter v. 
General Petrolenm Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [170 P.2d 898, 
167 A.L.R 271].) [ 4] Being a derivative action, a judg-
ment on the merits against the corporation on the wrong 
alleged to have been done to it would ordinarily be res judicata 
in an action by the stockholders on behalf of the corporation 
for the same wrong. This follo·ws because the wrong was to 
the corporation as such and not the stockholders individually, 
henee a bar to an aetion by the corporation would be a bar 
to an action by the stockholders for the corporation. (Scar-
bourongh v. Briggs, 81 Cal.App.2d 161 [183 P.2d 683]; see 
Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cai.2d 11, 28 [265 P.2d 1] ; 
Fletcher Cyc. Corps. (perm.ed.) § 5859; 50 C.J.S., Judg-
ments, § 794.) 
Here we have a judgment (the Nevada judgment) of 
dismissal with prejudice, rendered by the court on a motion 
therefor by plaintiff. [5] Whether such a judgment is a 
bar-res judicata-as to another action on the same cause 
in this state is controlled by Nevada law. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1913; Rall v. Lovell, 105 CaL\ pp.'2d 007 [233 P.2d 
681]; Smith v. Smith, 115 Cal.App.2d 92 [251 P.2d 720]; 
; Goodrich on 
Conflicts, § 450.) 
The rule '' ( 1) The effect of a valid judg-
or other interests of the parties and 
persons in with them is determined by the law of 
the state where the was rendered. 
The effect of a valid as a conclusive 
between the and persons in with 
them of have been put in issue 
in the proceedings is determined the law of the state 
where the judgment was rendered." (Rest., Conflicts, § 450.) 
[8] Our courts take judicial notice of "the laws of the 
several states of the United Statrs and the interpretation 
therrof by the highest courts of appPllate jurisdiction of such 
states." (CodP Civ. Proc., § 1875.) In Nevada the statute 
with reference to dismissal, at tlw time the dismissal here 
was made, provided that an action may be dismissed by 
plaintiff at any time before trial if no affirmative relief is 
sought by defendant; by either party with the consent of 
the other; by the court when plaintiff fails to appear at 
the trial; by the court when upon trial plaintiff ''abandons'' 
it; on nonsuit; and in ''every other ease judgment shall be 
rendered on the merits." (Nev. Compiled Laws ( 1929), 
§ 8793, as amended in 1939, Nev. Stats. 1939, p. 33.) * It 
has been held by the Supreme Court of Nevada that where 
there is a dismissal of the action at plaintiff's behest but 
nothing is said about prejudice that the judgment is not 
on the merits and hence not a bar to a subsequent action by 
plaintiff on the same cause (Van Vliet v. Olin, 1 Nev. 495; 
James v. Leport, 19 Nev. 174 [8 P. 47); Christensen v. Duborg, 
38 Nev. 404 [150 P. 306] ), but where it is dismissed on the 
stipulation of the parties it is on the merits and a bar. (Phill-
potts v. Blasdel, 10 Nev. 19.) [9] We find no Nevada 
statute or case law covering the case we have here where 
the plaintiff moved the court for judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice and the judgment of dismissal was with prejudice. 
Under those circumstances we will assume the Nevada law 
is not out of harmony with ours and thus we look to our law 
for a solution of the problem. (See Str·md v. B1trgess, 144 
Me. 263 [68 A.2d 241, 12 A.L.R2d 939); Knox v. Pryor, 10 
Cal.App.2d 76 [51 P.2d 106]; 1vlcDonald v. Hartford Tntst 
Co., 104 Conn. 169 [132 A. 902] ; Dimon v. Dimon, concurring 
*Compare Code of Civil Pxocedure, sections 581, 58lb, 582, which are 
sirn.ilar. 
we said: "'l'hcre is a well-recognized distinction bet1veen a 
dismissal voluntarily made by the clerl,'s entry, which is 
to be without prejudice to the of another 
and a dismissal entered in open court pursuant to 
which is ordinarily effective as a retraxit. In 
the absence of such stipulation or motion addrrssed to the 
conrt, there is no Telraxit." Here, to the recital 
in the Nevada jndgmcnt, the dismissal with was 
made witl1 prejudice on the motion of the inn's attorneys. 
[11] It would seem clear that a dismissal with 
plaintiff of its action is a bar to a action on 
the same cause; otherwise there would be no meaning to the 
''with prejudice'' feature. [12] ''A dismissal with prejn-
dice terminates the action and the rights of the are 
affected by it. It is a final judgment in favor of defendants 
and they are entitled to recover their costs. [13] Bnt a 
mere statement that a judgment of dismissal is 'with preju-
dice' is not conclusive. It is the nature of the action and 
the character of the judgment that determines whether it 
is res judicata. The intention of the court to make a deter-
mination on the merits may be important, but if the judg-
ment is clearly not on the merits, the court's intention is 
immaterial. 
[14] "A dismissal without prejudice, on the other hand, 
is not a bar to another action by the plaintiff on the same 
cause. In other respects, however, it has the effect of a final 
judgment in favor of the defendant, for it terminates the 
action and concludes the rights of the parties in that particular 
action .... 
[15] "An order of dismissal containing no statement 
whatever that it is made without prejudice is not a bar to 
a subsequent action, unless the record shows that there was 
an actual determination on the merits." (16 Cal.J ur.2d, 
Dismissal, etc., § 5.) Finally, it is clear that any attack 
on the Nevada judgment raised by Burke as a defense 
in the instant action is collateral. (Kaufman v. Cal1:[Mnia 
Min. & Dredging Syn(Zieate, 16 Cal.2d 90 [104 P.2d 1038] ; 
Rest., Judgments, § 11, com. a.) [16] And, of course, a 
judgment of a court of a sister state having jurisdiction 
must be given full faith and credit. (U.S. Const., art. IV,§ 1.) 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Nevada court lacked 
jurisdiction, and its judgment is not a bar because Attorney 
456 ::\'I::VADA DEC:EHT T:-fN C.2d 
Morse had no inn's action with 
prejudice, Anderson had no to commence or prose· 
cute the action for the and the disHtissal was the result 
of collusion and fraud the directors of the 
inn and Morse. 
Aside from the of the tWope of the anthority of 
an attorney with power to repri1S<'llt a client in an 
action, to dismiss his client's action (here the dismissal by 
Morse of the inn's , being raised a direct attack 
on the there is the of whether such ques-
tion can be raised on a co11ateral attack on the judgment. 
[17a] It has been stated both in this state and Nevada that 
a domestic may not be collaterally on 
the ground that a regularly licensed appearing as 
such for a party to au aetion had no to act on his 
behalf. (See Deegan v. Deegan, 22 NeY. 185 [37 P. 360, 58 
Am.St.Rep. 742] ; Barber v. Barber, 47 Nev. 377 [222 P. 284, 
39 A.L.R 706], dictum; v. C1'ty of Oakland, 30 
Cal. 439; Nielsen v. Emerson, 119 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281]; 
Strand Imp. Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765 [161 P. 975], 
approving the Deegan and Carpentier cases; S11ydam v. 
Pitcher, 4 Cal. 280; Holmes v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 191; May v. 
Rosen, 91 Cal.App.2d 794 [205 P.2d 1118].) fn Hill v. City 
Cab & Transfer Co., 79 Cal. 188 [21 P. 728], the same rule 
was stated but a collateral attack was permitted because it 
was admitted that the attorney had no authority. [18] This 
is in line with the general rule that: ''On collateral attack 
every presumption is in favor of the validity of the judgment 
or order of a court of general jurisdidion, and any condition 
of facts consistent with its validity and not affirmatively 
contradictrd by the judgment roll will be presumed to have 
existed .... 
[19] "Under this general rule it will be presumed, when 
necessary, that the parties consented to the court's action 
or waived objection thereto." (Phelan v. Superior Court, 
35 Cal.2d 363, 373 [217 P.2d 951].) [17b] It is said in 88 
A.L.R. 12, 36: ''There is a lack of agreement among the courts 
on the question \Yhether or not a judgment can be attacked in 
a collateral proceeding on the grounds that the defendant 
was not served with process and that the attorney enterinl! 
his appearance had no authority to do so. The weight of 
authority supports the view that a domestic judgment, valid 
on its faee, is not subjeet to collateral attack on this ground.'' 
(Citing cases from the federal eourts and Arkansas, Indiana, 
1955] GAGXO~ Ixr. v. !\EYADA Dr.:sERT I:s-N 
448; 239 P.2d 4661 
Iowa, J,ouisiana, Maine, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 'l'exas 
and \Vest Virginia; contra, Illinois, Kans2:s, Nebraska, Oregon 
and Virginia. [See also 5 Am .• Jur ., Judgments, § 83].) 
[20] On the other hand with respect to foreign judgments 
(judgments of a sister state) it has been said: "Indeed, thr 
clause of the Federal Constitutiou which requires full faith 
and credit to be given in each state to the records and judicial 
proceedings of every other state applies to the rt>cords and 
proceedings of courts only so far as they have jurisdiction. 
and the courts of one state are not required to give full faith 
and credit to, or regard as valid or conclusive, any judgment 
of a court of another state, which had no jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, or of the partirs, or, in proceedings in rem, 
of the res. [21] Accordingly, the jurisdiction of a court 
rendering a judgment is open to inquiry under proper aver-
ments, when questioned in the court of another state. The 
party against whom the judgment is r0ndered is not forced 
to go to the state of the rendition of the judgment for rrlief. 
These rules have been applied in the case of a foreign .htdg-
ment entered upon an attorney's una~dhorized appearance 
for a party." (Emphasis added; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, 
§ 549. See Rest., Judgments, § 12, com. e; Carlton v. !Vhller, 
114 Cal.App. 272 [299 P. 738]; 50 C.J.S., Judgm0nts, 
§ 893e (6).) 
The question of the res judicata effect of the Nevada .judg-
ment of dismissal was raised by Burke's motion to dismiss 
the instant action and that was the sole issue presented to the 
court. The court in its order of dismissal r<>eited that the 
Nevada judgment was res judicata No other findings were 
made but the court in its remarks from the bench stated 
that as late as April, 1946, directors for Desert Inn had been 
elected including Lela Anderson; that a purported meeting 
of stockholders in Los Angeles in Septemb<>r, 1946, in which 
Anderson was removed, was a nullity as notice thereof was 
not given; that there is no showing that the action leading 
to the Nevada judgment of dismissal was not authorized by 
Desert Inn, inasmuch as Morse and Anderson were directors 
of it. Implicit in the dismissal of the California action, on 
the ground. of res judicata of the judgment in the Nevada 
action, is the finding that Anderson had authority to com-
mence th0 N<>vada action for the inn and Mor,;e had authority 
to act as its attorney and dismiss the Nevada action with 
GAGNO:\' INC. 1!. NEVADA DESERT INN C.2d 
and that there was no fraud or collusion in the 
commencement or dismissal of the Nevada action. 
At the hearing on the res judicata question the transcript 
of the trial in the first Nevada action which resulted in a 
nonsuit was introduced as was a transcript of the record in 
the second Nevada action. Morse's deposition was also re-
ceived. Therein he testified that he was a regularly licensed 
attorney practicing in Nevada; that he was one of the attor-
neys for the inn in the first Nevada action, being employed 
Barkley and Anderson ; that after the nonsuit was granted 
and in September, 1946, he wrote to Barkley stating he 
desired to withdraw as attorney in the first action and that 
he should obtain new counsel to file a new action; that after 
he wrote the letter any and all association with Barkley or 
plaintiff Gagnon was terminated; that he filed the second 
action at the request of Lela Anderson and her husband; that 
at the time of dismissal of that action he knew the California 
action was pending as did counsel for Burke. He filed an 
affidavit in the second action in reply to Burke's motion to 
dismiss for failure to bring it to trial. stating that there 
should not be a dismissal because the California action involv-
ing the same issues had been commenced and if it were not 
tried the second action should be dismissed. He stated that 
his dismissal of the second Nevada action was to have no 
relation ''whatsoever'' to the California action, no bearing 
on the issues in the California action, the one now before us. 
Burke was called as a witness. It was stipulated he signed 
the verified answer in the second Nevada action in which it 
was alleged that Anderson had no authority to bring it for 
the inn but Burke said he did not know whether or not she 
had such authority. He testified that he and his counsel, 
Mr. Pearlsen, went to Morse's office in November, 1950, to 
have Morse dismiss the second Nevada action. He testified 
that he and his counsel knew the California action had been 
commenced; that they talked with Morse about settling the 
second Nevada action and paid him some money ($1,500 or 
$1,700) in settlement thereof and Morse had the action dis-
missed with prejudice as above mentioned. What Morse did 
with the money does not appear. 
Mrs. Anderson testified that she signed the verification of 
the complaint in the second Nevada action in which she 
stated she was secretary of the inn, although she thought she 
was not at the time because of the purport eel stockholrlers' 
meeting which purported to remove her, but Morse told her 
INc. v. NEvADA DESEHT INN 459 
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and she took his advice; that she 
purported stockholders' meeting. 
Plaintiff Gagnon testified concerning the stockholders' 
in Los Angeles and that he vYas there elected presi-
dent of the inn; that neither he nor any of the other stock-
holders of the inn ever authorized or knew about the com-
mencement or dismissal of the second Nevada action and it 
was ~tipulated they did not know Morse filed that action. 
[22] Insofar as Anderson's authority is concerned, it 
would appear that the court was justifird in coneluding she 
was a director and secretary of the inn and the attempt to 
remove her was abortive. There may be a conflict in the 
evidence on thi1< issue but there is sufficient to support the 
conclusion of the trial court. Hence she would not lack 
authority to commence the second Nevada action by reason 
of her holding no official position with the corporation. 
[23] As to Morse's authority to commence the secoml 
Nevada action there is a presumption that he had such 
authority. '' 'The act of the attorney in entering the appear-
ance of a defendant carries with it a presumption of due 
authority upon his part to do so.' " ( Voinich v. Rollerz, 
203 Cal. 379, 382 f264 P. 240], quoting from Garrison v. 
McGowan, 48 Cal. 592, 600; see also Dale v. City Cmrrt of 
Merced, 105 Cal.App.2d 602 [234 P.2d 110]; People v. West-
ern Meat Co., 13 Cal.App. 539 [110 P. 338] ; Estate of Pailhe, 
114 Cal.App.2d 658 [251 P.2d 76]; Wilson v. Ba1·ry, 102 
Cal.App.2d 778 [228 P.2d 331] ; Sullivan v Dunne, 198 Cal. 
183 r244 P. 343]; 6 Cal.Jnr.2d, Attorneys at Law,§§ 154-155.) 
And that presumption may be weighed against evidence 
to the contrary by the trier of fact. (Dale v. City Co11rt of 
1lierced, supr·a, 105 Cal.App.2d 602.) The question should 
be decided by the trial court. ( S1lllivan v. Dunne, supra, 
198 Cal. 183.) 
[24] With reference to an attorney's authority to dismiss 
his client's action with prejudice it is said: ''An important 
problem is related to the distinction between voluntary dis-
missals or nonsuits which are without prejudice to the cause 
of action, and dismissals or nonsuits with prejudice, the last 
mentioned type being referred to in the cases by the common-
law term 'retraxit.' It is clearly within the attorney's 
authority to dismis1< the client's action without prejudice. 
However, a series of early cases held the general authority 
of an attorney even sufficient to empower him to effect a 
retraxit, amounting to a renunciation of the client's snb-
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stantive or cause of action. It is hardly possible to 
reconcile this rule with the established principle that the 
implied of an attorney does not include 
any power or authority to dispose of the client's substantive 
rights, and it would therefore seem doubtful whether, or to 
what extent, the cases would now be followed." ( 6 Cal. 
.Tur.2d, Attorneys at § 164.) [25] And further in 
that connection: ''In civil litigation, the attorney, as the 
client's agent, and in the absence of fraud, has authority to 
bind his dient in all matters pertaining to the regular conduct 
of a case. . . . ln the absence of such special instructions, 
the conduct and management of the action is entrusted to 
the attorney's judgment; he decides what should be contested, 
what points should be taken, and what should be abandoned. 
This authority is, however, subject to the qualification that an 
attorney ordinarily does not have implied authority to do 
an act which will effect the surrender or loss of a client's 
substantial rights, for the client determines 'the objectives 
to be attended.'" (6 CaLJnr.2d, Attorneys at I,aw, § 156.) 
[26] There is, however, a presumption that he has authority 
to compromise his client's action which he is prosecuting. 
(Chu.rch v. Chur·ch. 40 Cal.App.2d 701 [105 P.2d 643]; Burns 
v.lllcCain, 107 Cal.App. 291 [290 P. 62:i]; 66 A.L.R. 107, 126; 
~10 A.I,.R.2d 944, 953; Stale of l'•7evada v. Cal1:[ornia Llhn. Co., 
15 Nev. 234; Deegan v. Deegan, 22 Nev. 185 [37 P. 360, 58 
Am.St.Rep. 742].) Defendant Burke points out that there 
are authorities iu California and Nevada which bold that 
on collateral attack the presumption of the attorney's author-
ity is conclusive (Westwood Temple v. Enwnnel Center, 98 
Cal.App.2d 755 [221 P.2d 146]; Parks~de Realty Co. v. Mac-
Donald, 167 Cal. 842 [139 P. 805]; May v. Rosen, 91 CaL 
App.2d 794 [205 P.2d 1118] ; Deegan v. Deegan, supra, 22 
Nev. 185 [37 P. 860, 58 Am.St.Rep. 742] ), and it has been 
held that an attorney has authority to dismiss an action with 
prcj udice (the modern name for retraxit, Ghiringhelli v. 
Ribom, 95 Cal.App.2d 503 [213 P.2d 17]; Robinson v. Hiles, 
119 Cal.App.2d 666 [260 P.2d 194]) contrary to the rule at 
common law. (Lam.b v. Herndon, 97 Cal.App. 193 [275 P. 
503]; Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105 Cal.App. 189 [287 P. 149]; 
Chase v. Van Carnp Sea Food Co., 109 Cal.App. 38 [292 
P. 179]; but see 6 CaLJur.2d, Attorneys at };aw, § 164, supra.) 
·while the above cited cases may appear to conflict with the 
rule that ori1inarily an attorney has no anthority to surrender 
his client's rights quotation supra, from 6 Cal.J ur.2d, 
.1 4()1 
at Law, 164), may be reconciled on 
the theory that there is a rebuttable presumption that he 
had such authority. 
[27] It would seem, therefore, that the trial court was 
justified in concluding that l\Iorse had authority to commence 
the second Nevada action and to dismiss it with prejudice. 
[28] While there may be evidence from which it could be 
inferred that Morse and Anderson and Burke's counsel and 
Burke acted collusively and franclnlPntly, the question was 
for the trial court. Plaintiffs rely in part on the allegations 
in their complaint in the instant action that Morse, Burke, 
Anderson and other directors acted collusively and fraudu-
lently, but allegations are not proof. [29] It would seem 
that Morse's testimony that he cli(1 not think the dismissal 
of the second Nevada action woulcl affect the California action 
should not be allowed to altrr the res judicata effect on 
collateral attack. In effect it wa;s only his opinion of the 
legal effect of the dismissaL 
[30] Plaintiffs argue that Burke waived the defense of 
res judicata and is estopped to assert it, and in that connec-
tion, that they ~vere prevented from giving evidf~nee on that 
issue because the court confined the issue to res judicata. 
It is doubtful that there was any eonduct on which a plea 
of estoppel or waiver could be based as there was no change 
in position on plaintifFs' part in reliance on Burke's claim in 
the second Nevada action that Anderson ha(l no authorit:v 
to act for the corporation. In any event the question would 
appear to be one for the trial court. Confining the issue 
to res judicata, as was done by the trial court, did not fore-
close plaintiffs from making a showing that the defPnse bad 
been waived or that Burke was estopped from raising it, 
as that would be part of the res judicata issue. 
Plaintiffs c•laim that the case is an unusual one in 
which the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied (see 
Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Ca1.2d 23 [194 P.2d 1] ; Guardianship 
of Di Carlo, 3 Ca1.2d 225 [44 P.2d 562. 99 A.hR. 990]). 
This ease does not present the factors present in those casrs 
unless we hold that a dismissal with prejndice of an action 
by a corporation to recover for a wrong alleged to have been 
committed as to it cannot be res judicata where the dismissal 
occurs after stockholders have commenced a derivative action 
for the same wrong. No authority so holding has been cited 
and we find none. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court was "motivated" in 
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its order of dismissal by its finding that the prayer 
of the complaint was not sufficient. Even if we delve into the 
reasoning of the trial court it is clear it based its order on 
the premise of res judicata. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J., Traynor, 
J ., and Spence, J ., concurred. 
Schauer, 
[L.A. No. 23323. In Bank. Nov. 4, 1955.] 
MORTON .B'HEEDLAND et al., Respondents, v. 
DOMENICK R. GRECO, Appellant. 
[1] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Deficiency Judgment.-If 
there is only one note, secured by a chattel mortgage on equip-
ment sold and a trust deed on realty owned by the purchaser. 
which represents the purchaser's debt to the sellers, the sellers, 
on the trustee's sale of the realty under power of sale, would 
not be entitled to a deficiency judgment under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 580d, since the note is "secured by a deed of trust upon real 
property" on which there could not be a judgment for "any" 
deficiency. 
[2] !d.-Sale Under Power-Deficiency Judgment.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 580d, declaring that there shall be no deficiency 
,iudgment on a note secured by a trust deed or mortgage on 
realty in any case in which realty has been sold by the 
mortgagee or trustee under power of sale, does not require 
that the note be secured solely by a trust deed; hence if the 
note is secured by a trust deed on realty the code section 
applies though it may also be secured by other security. 
[3] !d.-Sale Under Power·-Deficiency Judgment.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 580d, precluding deilciency judgments following sales 
of realty nnder power of sale in a trust deed, does not preclude 
the creditor from foreclosing on any additional security, such 
as a chattel mortgage, but the pursuit of additional security 
is not a deficiency judgment, and the right to exhauc;t such 
security gives no right to such a judgment. (Disapproving a 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 86 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trust Deeds, 
s857 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Trust Deeds, § 95(2); [7] Stntntes, 
§ 124; [8] Statutes,~ 114; [9] Statutes,§ 166; [10] Statutes,§ lliO; 
[11] Contracts, § 148. 
